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- How has Russia’s place in U.S. foreign policy changed under the Biden administration?
- What factors have contributed to increased confrontation between the United States and Russia under the Biden administration?
- What factors limited U.S. foreign policy ambitions towards Russia, as well as any negotiation opportunities?
- Where was cooperation possible between the United States and Russia, and where were disputes inevitable?


Key points:
-The key trend of 2022 was the imposition against Russia of restrictive measures unprecedented in scale and number. According to the Castellum.AI project, in the period from February 22 to November 22, 2022, 10,184 sanctions were imposed against Russia, almost four times higher than the number of sanctions imposed on Moscow in the previous period.
-Western sanctions against Russia include a wide range of restrictive measures: blocking sanctions, sectoral sanctions, financial restrictions, export controls of goods and services, visa and diplomatic restrictions, transport sanctions, and disconnection of a number of financial institutions from the SWIFT system.
-The withdrawal of companies from the Russian market, the so-called “culture of cancellation” of Russia, and the curtailment of humanitarian ties for political reasons are fully consistent with the general trend of anti-Russian sanctions, and bolster it.
-Despite the wide range and impressive number of restrictions already imposed against Russia, there are risks of further escalation, including: building up enforcement measures, possible strengthening of the anti-Russian sanctions coalition.
-Thanks to the timely and effective decisions of the financial and economic authorities, Russia is quite successfully adapting to large-scale sanctions pressure.
-Many consumers in the world cannot refuse Russian energy, food and raw material exports, and some (for example, China and India), on the contrary are increasing supplies from Russia.l
-Moscow has managed to diversify imports through use of non-Western suppliers and the introduction of parallel imports.
-Under the current conditions, the transformation of the Russian economy is inevitable. The main vector of this will be aimed at strengthening the processes of digital transition, creating our own financial and technological platforms, reorienting export flows to friendly countries, and finding ways to cooperate with non-Western partners.
-An important factor will be the systematically organized import substitution of technologies and components in a number of key sectors of the Russian economy.


-Energy trade has been the backbone of the overall economic relationship between Russia and the West, especially Europe, but now it appears that this era is ending;
-Amid the uncertainty about who will pay for the restoration of Ukraine, the plans to confiscate Russia’s export earnings have emerged;
-An import tariff on the Russian energy export and schemes with escrow accounts in Western banks are among those plans;
-The EU introduces and considers additional tough measures to reduce Russia's energy exports: an embargo on Russian coal supplies is already in place from August 10, 2022, an oil embargo is being discussed, and plans are being worked out to phase out Russian gas;
-Due to the inelasticity of supply and demand in the energy markets, the interdependence of Russia and Europe cannot be eliminated by directives;
-The introduction of the “gas for rubles” scheme by Russia was a pragmatic response to attempts to control export revenues from the EU, the rejection of this scheme by PGNiG and Bulgargaz has already led to a halt in direct gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria;
-The discussed oil embargo against Russia or problems with the "gas for rubles" scheme could trigger a series of extreme disasters, politicians are raising the stakes in an energy game that could get out of hand
