Publications

The chapter investigates the main challenges and opportunities that Russia faces in the Central Asian region vis-à-vis China 

The book pivots on theme of ethno-nationalisms and "big" ideas in central Eurasia. Specifically, the it aims at examining the impact of some ideologies on the creation of national identities linked to history, culture and specific Eurasian political projects, with particular reference to the area between Eastern Europe and Central Asia. From a comparative analysis perspective, it aims to describe some particularly relevant constructs for the creation of the political imaginary of the great spaces of civilization in Eurasia and aims to understand how they have influenced - and still influence - a nationalistic and identity narrative. Each ideology wants to be presented both in its original philosophical-ideological conception and in its concrete application and historical-political evolution. Pivoting on the philosophical-cultural contrast between Iran and Turan, that is, between sedentary humanity and nomadic humanity, the research aims in particular to deepen the construction of collective identities through political narratives and ideological schemes in the Eurasian macro-region.

The establishment of the All-Russian Association of the South Pacific Researchers is a remarkable event for the Russian regional studies community and the state agencies involved in the developing and implementation of Russia’s foreign policy. The Association’s activity will give an added impetus to the Russian research on the South Pacific, which will result in developing the globally-competitive Russian analytical school in the mid-term perspective. In its turn, this will increase the efficiency of Russia’s foreign policy not only in the South Pacific, but also in other regions, as well as strengthen Russia’s international political and economic positions, raise its status as a top-rank global power.

 

Interregional and cross-border cooperation between Russia and China is not only an important part of bilateral interactions, but also an incentive for the accelerated development of border territories. Studying the results of Russian-Chinese cross-border cooperation over the past 30 years makes it possible to track the institutional changes of the two countries, as well as the overall dynamics of their foreign trade and investment activities. The main feature of the current state of Russian-Chinese cross-border cooperation is the gradual fading of interest in it on both sides, which is in contradiction with the growing number of state programs, framework agreements and initiatives with serious political support. In order to understand the reasons for such an imbalance, this paper consistently analyzes the main dimensions and indicators of Russian-Chinese cross-border cooperation, as well as the regulatory framework and the results of the implementation of state programs and projects. On the example of successful and failed cases, an attempt is made to identify the deep obstacles to the development of interregional cooperation at different levels and compare them with the problems that Chinese experts highlight.

The chapter examines the driving forces and the institutions behind the Russian military buildup in the period between 2010 and 2020. The beginning of the rapid Russian military modernization in late 2000s was the result of the shifting threat assesments by the Russian political leadership and the painful lessons of the war with Georgia in 2008. Russia had to conduct an throughout and painful restructuring of the military institutions and the defense industrial complex in order to be able to meet the ambitious goals of its’ rearmament program. The result was significant growth in the Russian military capabilities by the middle of the decade.

The chapter opens with a brief overview of the provisions of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) establishing the general principles and rules of competition. It further presents a detailed analysis of the main features and characteristics of the EAEU competition law. Among the issues discussed in this article is the direct effect and direct applicability of the general rules of competition, the relation between EAEU and national competition law provisions as well as the division of competence between the Eurasian Economic Commission and national competition authorities. The relevant features and provisions of EAEU competition law, such as the notion of ‘coordination of economic activity’ are analysed through the prism of the EAEU Court’s advisory opinions. The authors also use a comparative approach drawing parallels and underlining the differences with EU law and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Finally, the authors also examine the mechanisms of judicial protection available under EAEU law to economic entities in the field of competition law.

A carbon price is considered the most cost-efficient GHG emissions reduction tool often used as part of a mature climate policy. However, Russia as well as the other countries rich in fossil fuels tend to have weak incentives for proactive low-carbon policies including carbon pricing which may lead to falling revenues in emitting industries. Can the price on carbon be implemented as part of the development strategy in fossil fuel exporting countries, including post-Communist Russia? The paper focuses on the variety of existing approaches to applying the carbon price across various energy exporting economies. Based on theoretical and empirical evidence, the paper contributes to the existing literature with the analysis of challenges and opportunities of carbon pricing in these countries and outlines key principles of a viable carbon pricing system in Russia. These principles are (a) balanced emissions coverage and support of the vulnerable industries and social groups, (b) fiscal neutrality, (c) gradualness of implementation and (d) the use of carbon offsets.

This chapter reveals the essence and basic principles of the EAEU modern foreign economic strategy to effectively respond to external challenges and strengthen its positioning in Eurasia. The authors conclude that to enhance its competitiveness, the EAEU needs a transition and activation of new formats of bilateral and multilateral interaction, including FTA plus agreements, dialogue partnerships, and the integration of integrations format, which is now in its infancy. Such diversification is necessary for the more effective building of relations with third countries, regional trade blocs, and intergovernmental organizations and is still inadequately limited in the EAEU practice

This article examines the current trends in the development of the energy sector in the Republic of Kazakhstan. It is a key factor in the country’s competitiveness and a driver of the comprehensive modernization of Kazakhstani society. Considerable attention is heeded to the development risks in various sectors of the fuel and energy complex that affect Kazakhstan’s multi-vector energy policy. The urgent task of the country’s instrument sustainable development and the creation of a more balanced energy sector lead to the conclusion that a synergetic approach is prioritized in Kazakhstan’s policy. This approach entails the development of “energy pluralism” with the prospect of further diversification of the country’s energy balance and an emphasis on innovative development.

 

The book considers the evolution of German geopolitical thought between late nineteenth century and first half of twentieth, focusing specifically on Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, Karl Haushofer, and Carl Schmitt. It also focuses on Hitler’s dream expressed in his books and private conversations of creating a Eurasian empire from western Europe to the Urals.

The book investigates the main geopolitical aspects of the Eurasianist ideology

 

The National Security Strategy, approved by President Vladimir Putin’s decree of July 2, 2021, is the main document defining the general goals and objectives of Russia’s development in the current international situation. Although the country, as the Strategy states, has a favorable geographical position, the document is defensive in content with regard to the most important external challenges and threats. In this sense, the Strategy continues the Russian foreign policy tradition that considers the ability to protect the demographic and resource base of the state to be the most important development task.

Continuing the discussion of the first part on current Eurasian integration, in their chapter "The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: Not Just for Government- to-Government Dispute Settlement" Ekaterina Diyachenko and Kirill Entin posit that, since its establishment in 2015, the EAEU Court has mainly been seen as a mechanism for resolving trade disputes between governments or for interpreting EAEU law in abstracto via its advisory opinions. As a result, the EAEU Court's potential has been largely underutilized by economic entities despite a liberal locus standi and the possibility to challenge the validity of both individual acts (for instance, in the field of EAEU competition law) and regulatory acts of general application adopted by the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), including antidumping measures or even technical regulations.

The present chapter aims to discuss how the EAEU Court may help private actors protect their rights and legitimate interests under EAEU law. It examines the different types of actions available to economic entities, the admissibility criteria and the consequences of the Court’s judgements. As the analysis of the EAEU Court’s case-law shows, the action for failure to act is of particular importance as it may be used by private entities as an indirect mechanism to make Member States comply with their obligations under EAEU law.

Finally, the authors also address the issue of the sources of law that private actors could rely upon, including the ambiguous status of the WTO law in the EAEU legal order.

Russia is bracing to turn from its centuries-old foreign policy model (dating back to the Moscow Principality) to maintain direct control over its immediate periphery as a way to provide for its security. How new self-defense methods get integrated into the nation’s strategic culture can play a crucial role in the future.

The events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine prompted the European Union (EU) to adopt several ‘packages’ of restrictive measures against Russia. A number of attempts have been made by natural and legal persons to challenge the validity of those measures before the General Court and the Court of Justice of the EU. Despite the fact that the applicants in all of these cases were unsuccessful and the judgments largely confirmed the existing case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), these cases deserve special attention for a number of reasons.

Firstly, they provide an important clarification of the application of the listing criteria developed in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. In the Rotenberg and Kiselev cases, the General Court gave a restrictive reading of the notion of ‘active support’ used in the sanction criteria as covering only those forms of support which, by their quantitative or qualitative significance, contribute to Russia’s actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. This rather restrictive reading fits well with the fifth principle guiding the EU’s policy towards Russia, implying that only a small group of persons will be liable to fall under this criterion and that it will not threaten people-to-people contacts at large.

Secondly, the Court had the opportunity to rule on the validity of different types of measures. While the Almaz-Antey Air and Space Defence, Kiselev, and Rotenberg cases dealt with the freezing of assets, in other cases the Court examined general economic measures, such as the restriction of access to capital markets and export restrictions. Rosneft and NK Rosneft and Others present a particular interest in this regard as the Court addressed the issue of the legality of those measures with regard to the provisions of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994 (PCA) and WTO law. Those expecting an elaborate analysis were however quickly disappointed as the Court basically confirmed the Council’s broad discretion for the adoption of political decisions. In its appraisal of the necessity of restrictive measures for the protection of EU essential security interests, it relied entirely on the Council’s assessment contained in the preambles of the contested acts transforming an already limited judicial control in a pure formality. In a situation where restrictive measures are imposed by the EU on the ground of international law violations, this reluctance by the CJEU to exercise an effective control as to the respect of international law – or at least conduct its own assessment of the situation –  can be seen as questioning the Court’s stance as an independent non-political institution.

Thirdly, what is even more important, some of the cases brought a significant contribution to the development of the Court’s jurisprudence in the area of CFSP as the Court was prompted to deal with several new legal issues. The Rotenberg case, for instance, answers the question of whether persons in charge of certain businesses may be included in the sanctions list because they benefited from the decision-makers at any point in time or whether the EU institutions need to demonstrate the existence of such a connection at the time when the third state’s illegal actions took place. In the Kiselev case, the General Court had to ascertain the legality of restrictive measures taken against a journalist in the light of the freedom of expression. In its turn in Rosneft, the Court of Justice ruled on the possibility to challenge the legality of autonomous restrictive measures via the preliminary reference procedure. Finally, the number and nature of the cases may also contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of the sanctions. The present chapter does not seek to describe the cases one by one, but rather analyses their contribution to the development of the CJEU case-law on restrictive measures by focusing on the key issues discussed in these cases.

 

As manifest challenger of the United States (US)-led international order, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has inaugurated a revisionist strategy that encompasses a multifaceted spectrum of initiatives, including an ambitious naval military build-up. History has shown that revisionist and challenging powers tend to defy the established order through arm races. US Admiral Mahan and German Admiral Tirpitz theorized two different approaches to naval strategy, the former focusing on global maritime hegemony and the latter on regional counterbalance based on risk theory. This article attempts at explaining the puzzle of China’s naval buildup through the lenses of geopolitics, adding a geopolitical dimension to the current debate. It suggests that the PRC’s naval military development does not follow a Mahanian global maritime strategy aimed at challenging the US primacy worldwide, but rather a Tirpitzian regional approach focused on counterbalancing the US presence within the scope of China’s sea power projection, that is, the Pacific region. To substantiate this hypothesis, the study compares diachronically contemporary Chinese naval arm race with Wilhelmine Germany’s High Seas Fleet. The findings underscore that, in maritime terms, China’s revisionism vis-à-vis the US somewhat resembles that of Imperial Germany vis-à-vis Imperial Britain, both aiming at regional counterbalance and antiaccess and area-denial (A2/AD) tactics rather than global maritime counterhegemony. Although Chinese sea power is still far from posing a serious threat to that of the US and its allies, an unrestrained continuation of Beijing’s naval buildup could encourage arms races and direct confrontation due to regional security dilemmas.

Situated at the crossroads of the Silk Road, Central Asia is included in the region described by Halford Mackinder as the Heartland of the Eurasian continent and has been an arena of international competition for centuries. Today, a “New Great Game” appears to be taking place between Russia, China, and, to a lesser extent, the United States, and the European Union for regional hegemony. In the last two decades, Russia and China formed an “axis of convenience,” both to counter Western influence and to thwart regional challenges; however, recent Sino-Russian relations have experienced an increasing rivalry. Specifically, regarding geo-economic and energetic assets, China appears to be gradually replacing Russia as chief power in some Central Asian countries. To evaluate the shift towards China’s primacy, the Power Transition Theory represents a helpful methodological tool. The impact of the “Belt and Road Initiative” on the five central Asian former Soviet republics – specifically its liaisons with Kazakhstan’s “Bright Path” and with the Uzbek New Strategy of Development –, as well as the prevalent Chinese role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, provide empirical evidence to support the Power Transition theoretical frame regarding dissatisfied challengers. The forecast of the region contemplates two scenarios, namley China's predominance or a Chinese-Russian modus vivendi based on a "division of labour".

This article examines the evolution and potential of the water agenda of BRICS. The members of this international association of major countries of South America, Eurasia, Asia and Africa are rich in water resources and population. The development of water resources extends beyond their borders to projects in other countries through the activities of a major development institution, the New Development Bank of BRICS. Such conditions suggest some anticipation of a global and comprehensive view on the part of BRICS on the issues relating to water resources. However, the hypothesis of this article is opposite: despite the unique potential of the BRICS water strategy, it remains non-specific, focused on the lower common denominators for the member countries such as cleanliness, sanitation and water management. To account for this, the authors take the position that the bureaucratic logic of basic common interest downgrades strategic vision. This is reflected in the growing gap between the multifaceted nature of the issues related to water resources in the world and the narrowly specialized approach of BRICS association which perceives water de facto without its resource and global function. To study this, the authors analyze the water portfolios of the BRICS member countries and compare the national water agendas based on an analysis of policy documents. They then systematize water initiatives under the auspices of the BRICS and, finally, calculate virtual water flows and their structure between the BRICS countries using agricultural products trade as an example. The conducted analysis allows the authors to identify a wide gap between the current and potential water agenda of the BRICS. The authors then propose a number of initiatives that can create added value for the BRICS as an association both for its member countries and for developing countries facing water resource challenges. The authors assert that such a new approach, based on a profound understanding of the resource function of water as a commodity with global value, has all the potential to be implemented by BRICS.