Since around 2017–2018, the world has been living through a period of progressive erosion, or collapse, of international orders inherited from the past. With the election of Donald Trump and the rapid increase of US containment of Russia and China—which is both a consequence of this gradual erosion and also represents deep internal and international contradictions—this process entered its apogee. A period of collapse opens up possibilities for the creation of a new world order; hopefully, a fairer, stable, and peaceful order than has been previously experienced. Russia has a good chance of influencing the formation a new order.
Country Report Russian section
Eurasia, wherever one draws the boundaries, is very much at the centre of discussions about today’s world. Security across Eurasia is a global concern and has been subject to a range of discussions and debate. However, the current tensions over security and world order, with the growing challenges from Eurasia and Asia, require more intense scrutiny. The goals of the book are to explore the challenges facing the region and to assess how to achieve economic, social and political stability in the Eurasian core.
Hay marcada diferencia entre las regiones de España en las preferencias de sus habitantes en la organización territorial del Estado: - un Estado con un único Gobierno central sin autonomías, - un Estado con menor o mayor autonomía que en la actualidad, - o el que se reconociese a las comunidades autónomas la posibilidad de convertirse en los Estados independientes. Estos sentimentos y attitudes son muy politizados y la busqueda de identidades es uno de los aspectos de la turbulencia politica.
Eurasia has never been one of major directions of Japan’s foreign policy, but its importance for Tokyo is growing. This article analyzes its increasing significance to foreign policy of Japan, causes and consequences of this policy’s duality and inconsistency. It also studies the reasons for the limited success of Tokyo’s diplomacy in Eurasia and discusses possible prospects for growing Japanese involvement in the region. It concludes that Japan’s Eurasian policy is inconsistent and is likely to remain so since the cause behind it remains unchanged – that is, the contradiction between Japan’s actual economic interests and its willingness to follow in the ideological and geopolitical footsteps of the U.S. The path Japan takes in the future will largely depend on the economic results of the implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt, its linkage with the plans of the Eurasian Economic Union, the progress of Russian–Chinese cooperation, and the project of Greater Eurasian partnership put forward by Russia and supported by China. If the economic projects of Eurasia’s non-Western players prove effective, Tokyo will be more tempted to cooperate with them despite its close ties with the U.S. However, if Eurasia’s non-Western states, and particularly China, are overly active with their foreign policy and militaries in the Asia Pacific, it will push Tokyo to create a variety of structures that would curb and serve as a political counterbalance to Chinese and Russian influence.
The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) project in January 2017
effectively marked the end (at least—for some time) of the period of active competition
between so-called “mega-regional agreements” in the Asia-Pacific region. A flagship of
the Obama administration’s initiatives in Asia, the TPP spurred China to intensify work
on an alternative project—its Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—
and sparked an unusual wave of competition among APR institutions. Significantly,
Russia joined this “partnership race” in 2016, putting forward an initiative to build a
Greater Eurasian Partnership. It became something of a given that any power aspiring to
regional leadership must have its own “partnership plan” to promote. At the same time,
the formation and development of mega-regional partnerships is an important stage in
the regionalization of the world economy and global politics and a key element of the
new phenomenon of regionalization. This article examines the TPP and RCEP initiatives
as attempts to form a regional international order holding some degree of autonomy
from the global set of rules for the functioning of regional international systems—in this
case, that of the APR.
The current international order is in transition, driven by the interplay of its main actors, Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and less significantly, the European Union and other emerging forces. If successful, a multipolar global order will eventually be created. However, the transient international order is characterised by chronic instability, regional and global turmoil, and dramatically complicated governance. The central question is whether the emerging multipolar order can provide security and welfare for the international community. Or, will we see policies based on narrow national interests, being bound to bound to reawaken memories of the bipolar Cold War era and its proxy wars? In this book, twelve authors from the US, Russia, Europe and China analyse what the multipolar world order could bring about and how it will affect the predominant powers in the international system.
The United States (US) and Russia are among the main contributors to Climate Change (as the 2nd and 4th largest emitters of greenhouse gases worldwide, accordingly), and have vast territories impacted environmentally and economically by this scientific and social phenomenon. The northern territories of both countries are especially vulnerable. In this article, we focus on coastal erosion and permafrost degradation, two Climate Change indicators that impact both Russia and the US, and for which the consequences will be disastrous without sufficient adaptation measures. We highlight the importance of cooperation across borders at the inter-regional level, considering the ambiguity of both American and Russian federal climate policies. The paper is divided as follows: (1) background on the science of Climate Change, permafrost thaw, coastal erosion, and the community impacts of permafrost degradation and coastal erosion in Alaska and Russia; (2) an overview of existing relocation and adaptation efforts for relevant communities and infrastructure in both countries; (3) a proposal of subnational cooperation between the US and Russia as a promising avenue for bilateral cooperation on these shared challenges, with a focus on the potential for cooperation between the regions of Tyumen, Alaska, and California.
While Russia’s policy in Southeast Asia encounters serious deficiencies, in 2016 plans to raise Russia-ASEAN relationship to the level of strategic partnership were announced at the top level. The puzzle, therefore, is why cooperation between Russia and ASEAN in Eurasia will lay the foundation for Russia-ASEAN strategic partnership. The article gives insights in Russia’s policy in Southeast Asia through the prism of ASEAN prospective plans, traces the increase in bilateral cooperation in Eurasia, assesses the potential of the format ASEAN-SCO-EAEU and its implications for Russia’s policy in Southeast Asia. The authors argue that Russia-ASEAN strategic partnership will be premised upon their cooperation in the Greater Eurasia, which will give a strong impetus to Russia’s policy in Southeast Asia. The findings include the identification of reasons behind premising the planned Russia-ASEAN strategic partnership, the obstacles the parties will have to overcome, and the impact of this cooperation upon Russia-ASEAN connectivity.
Historically, the central principles of international peacekeeping have been formulated by western powers due to their political and ideological domination in international institutions, including the United Nations (UN) family. It is only recently that emerging powers, among them Russia and China, have started to formulate their own policies of peacekeeping and to implement them in practice. While the general objectives of peacekeeping as understood by western nations and emerging powers are similar, there are differences of emphasis. Recent developments in Syria and the active involvement of Russia in these events have underscored the nuanced views these two approaches hold on peacekeeping in general and on outside involvement in peacekeeping operations.
For the United States and many European countries, the goal of peacekeeping and conflict resolution is to protect individual rights and freedoms and to accomplish a “democratic transition” by replacing authoritarian regimes with liberal-democratic alternatives. For Russia as well as many other emerging powers, the goal of conflict resolution and peacekeeping is to preserve and strengthen the local state structures so that they can support law and order on their territory and stabilize the situation in the country and the region. The western approach assumes that donor countries know better what to do with regard to local problems, while a “rising powers” approach is far less dogmatic and recognizes the right of actors to make mistakes along the way.
This article focuses on Russia’s approaches to peacekeeping as they are defined theoretically and practicall
The authors argue that Russian-Chinese rapprochement is a fundamental feature of the current changing system of international relations. The two countries are effectively enabling each other to conduct independent foreign policies often in direct opposition to the West. There is a degree of complimentarity between the two sides with Russia having comparative advantage in the military, intelligence, and diplomatic fields and China being an economic superpower. The region of Central Asia has in reality become the cradle of the two countries’ cooperation which is now affecting a wide range of international issues. The Korean peninsula is another important area of coordination between Moscow and Beijing in the Asia-Pacific. Russia and China have also been working on increasing interoperability of their military forces in the region since mid- 2000s. Technically they have already done much in preparing the ground for a military alliance. However, politically they do not appear to be ready for that yet.
Innovation in the Russian defense industry has drawn significant international attention since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state of the nation address of March 1, 2018. While the first part of the address covered the usual ground of planned economic policies, the second part was an extended presentation of Russian defense industry achievements. What Putin left outwas as important as what he highlighted, and provides a clear picture of Russia’s prioritization of radical over incremental innovation, sometimes to the detriment of current battlefield readiness. This research brief discusses Russia’s successes and failures in modernizing its weapons systems since 2000.
This is a pioneering examination of the burgeoning US-China defense technological competition and provides perspectives not only from US analysts but also from China and Russia. One of the major contributions of the book is the use of a competitive strategies framework that outlines some of the key considerations in the assessment of US–China military technological competition. A rich and expansive discussion of this competition across a diverse range of domains, including air, sea, space, and emerging technologies, provides a comprehensive understanding of how complex and varied this contest is becoming, as well as its strategic and global implications.
The pivot to the Asia-Pacific region is Russia’s strategic response to existential challenges such as the threat of losing great power status, and the need to maintain territorial integrity and independence. This strategy should not be viewed as meant only to ameliorate the economic and demographic situation in the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia. Instead, it should be interpreted as an opportunity for Russia to break out of the economic, security, and geographic traps she finds herself in within the Western-dominated international order. The emerging Asia-Pacific regional order may develop into a new international order that will be more competitive; it will not be dominated by a single power or ideology but will instead rest on multiple centers of power. This order will be more favorable to Russia than the unipolar Atlantic one, helping Russia utilize her comparative advantages in the territory, resources, hard power, political organization, and ability to mobilize resources for strategic goals
In this CNA Occasional Paper, Russian East Asia expert Vasily Kashin examines the current state of Russian-Chinese defense and security cooperation, Russia’s approach to developing it, and the possible outcomes of a further Russia-China rapprochement. He highlights the historical antecedents to the unprecedently long period of close ties between the two countries, focusing on the mutual advantages derived by both countries from defense industrial cooperation. The paper describes the gradually depending nature of bilateral military cooperation across a number of domains, including arms sales and joint exercises. The paper also addresses Russia’s evolving views on China’s increasing global role and the potential for an even closer Russia-China strategic alliance in the future, concluding that although the two countries are not ready for Western-style cooperation in defense technology, they are gradually moving toward a security partnership characterized by greater integration and interdependence.
This article examines the first years of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) through the prism of the Eurasian Economic Union Court’s jurisprudence and draws parallels with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The EAEU Court has taken first steps in establishing an autonomous legal order, but also in linking it with international law. It has interpreted the relevant law to create a system of legal remedies and started in the interpretive construction of a common market. We conclude that some differences to EU law are due to the institutional context. At the same time, the EAEU Court has deliberately taken some decisions to establish its own balance between autonomy and openness of the legal order it is called to interpret and simultaneously create.
Since 2015 Eurasian Economic Commission has become a key agent of Russian external trade policy, Conjunction policy with Belt and Road Initiative and has been responsible for all current FTZ negotiations and in a future – on wider frames of international cooperation that involves economic agenda. However because of a short track list of Commission’s activity, this field is not very well studied both in Russia and abroad. This article analyzes current international tracks between Commission and Asian countries and attempts to study other formats of cooperation with Asian actors where Commission can be involved in the future according to its mandate. Our study reveals that bilateral track remains dominant between EAEU and Asian partners and a switch to multilateral tracks like EAEU-ASEAN or EAEU-RCEP can occur only in a mid-term future. Both the analysis of open negotiations and Commission’s organizational resources prove this hypothesis.