Since around 2017–2018, the world has been living through a period of progressive erosion, or collapse, of international orders inherited from the past. With the election of Donald Trump and the rapid increase of US containment of Russia and China—which is both a consequence of this gradual erosion and also represents deep internal and international contradictions—this process entered its apogee. A period of collapse opens up possibilities for the creation of a new world order; hopefully, a fairer, stable, and peaceful order than has been previously experienced. Russia has a good chance of influencing the formation a new order.
Country Report Russian section
Eurasia, wherever one draws the boundaries, is very much at the centre of discussions about today’s world. Security across Eurasia is a global concern and has been subject to a range of discussions and debate. However, the current tensions over security and world order, with the growing challenges from Eurasia and Asia, require more intense scrutiny. The goals of the book are to explore the challenges facing the region and to assess how to achieve economic, social and political stability in the Eurasian core.
Hay marcada diferencia entre las regiones de España en las preferencias de sus habitantes en la organización territorial del Estado: - un Estado con un único Gobierno central sin autonomías, - un Estado con menor o mayor autonomía que en la actualidad, - o el que se reconociese a las comunidades autónomas la posibilidad de convertirse en los Estados independientes. Estos sentimentos y attitudes son muy politizados y la busqueda de identidades es uno de los aspectos de la turbulencia politica.
Eurasia has never been one of major directions of Japan’s foreign policy, but its importance for Tokyo is growing. This article analyzes its increasing significance to foreign policy of Japan, causes and consequences of this policy’s duality and inconsistency. It also studies the reasons for the limited success of Tokyo’s diplomacy in Eurasia and discusses possible prospects for growing Japanese involvement in the region. It concludes that Japan’s Eurasian policy is inconsistent and is likely to remain so since the cause behind it remains unchanged – that is, the contradiction between Japan’s actual economic interests and its willingness to follow in the ideological and geopolitical footsteps of the U.S. The path Japan takes in the future will largely depend on the economic results of the implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt, its linkage with the plans of the Eurasian Economic Union, the progress of Russian–Chinese cooperation, and the project of Greater Eurasian partnership put forward by Russia and supported by China. If the economic projects of Eurasia’s non-Western players prove effective, Tokyo will be more tempted to cooperate with them despite its close ties with the U.S. However, if Eurasia’s non-Western states, and particularly China, are overly active with their foreign policy and militaries in the Asia Pacific, it will push Tokyo to create a variety of structures that would curb and serve as a political counterbalance to Chinese and Russian influence.
The current international order is in transition, driven by the interplay of its main actors, Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and less significantly, the European Union and other emerging forces. If successful, a multipolar global order will eventually be created. However, the transient international order is characterised by chronic instability, regional and global turmoil, and dramatically complicated governance. The central question is whether the emerging multipolar order can provide security and welfare for the international community. Or, will we see policies based on narrow national interests, being bound to bound to reawaken memories of the bipolar Cold War era and its proxy wars? In this book, twelve authors from the US, Russia, Europe and China analyse what the multipolar world order could bring about and how it will affect the predominant powers in the international system.
The United States (US) and Russia are among the main contributors to Climate Change (as the 2nd and 4th largest emitters of greenhouse gases worldwide, accordingly), and have vast territories impacted environmentally and economically by this scientific and social phenomenon. The northern territories of both countries are especially vulnerable. In this article, we focus on coastal erosion and permafrost degradation, two Climate Change indicators that impact both Russia and the US, and for which the consequences will be disastrous without sufficient adaptation measures. We highlight the importance of cooperation across borders at the inter-regional level, considering the ambiguity of both American and Russian federal climate policies. The paper is divided as follows: (1) background on the science of Climate Change, permafrost thaw, coastal erosion, and the community impacts of permafrost degradation and coastal erosion in Alaska and Russia; (2) an overview of existing relocation and adaptation efforts for relevant communities and infrastructure in both countries; (3) a proposal of subnational cooperation between the US and Russia as a promising avenue for bilateral cooperation on these shared challenges, with a focus on the potential for cooperation between the regions of Tyumen, Alaska, and California.
While Russia’s policy in Southeast Asia encounters serious deficiencies, in 2016 plans to raise Russia-ASEAN relationship to the level of strategic partnership were announced at the top level. The puzzle is why cooperation between Russia and ASEAN in Eurasia will lay the foundation for their strategic partnership. The article gives insights in Russia’s policy in SA through the prism of ASEAN prospective plans, traces the increase in bilateral cooperation in Eurasia, assesses the potential of the ASEAN-SCO-EAEU format and its implications for Russia’s policy in SA. The authors argue that Russia-ASEAN strategic partnership will be premised upon their cooperation in the Greater Eurasia, which will give a strong impetus to Russia’s policy in SA. The findings include the identification of reasons behind premising the planned Russia-ASEAN strategic partnership on the Greater Eurasia’s foundation, the obstacles the parties will have to overcome, and the impact of this cooperation upon Russia-ASEAN connectivity.
Historically, the central principles of international peacekeeping have been formulated by western powers due to their political and ideological domination in international institutions, including the United Nations (UN) family. It is only recently that emerging powers, among them Russia and China, have started to formulate their own policies of peacekeeping and to implement them in practice. While the general objectives of peacekeeping as understood by western nations and emerging powers are similar, there are differences of emphasis. Recent developments in Syria and the active involvement of Russia in these events have underscored the nuanced views these two approaches hold on peacekeeping in general and on outside involvement in peacekeeping operations.
For the United States and many European countries, the goal of peacekeeping and conflict resolution is to protect individual rights and freedoms and to accomplish a “democratic transition” by replacing authoritarian regimes with liberal-democratic alternatives. For Russia as well as many other emerging powers, the goal of conflict resolution and peacekeeping is to preserve and strengthen the local state structures so that they can support law and order on their territory and stabilize the situation in the country and the region. The western approach assumes that donor countries know better what to do with regard to local problems, while a “rising powers” approach is far less dogmatic and recognizes the right of actors to make mistakes along the way.
This article focuses on Russia’s approaches to peacekeeping as they are defined theoretically and practicall
Innovation in the Russian defense industry has drawn significant international attention since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state of the nation address of March 1, 2018. While the first part of the address covered the usual ground of planned economic policies, the second part was an extended presentation of Russian defense industry achievements. What Putin left outwas as important as what he highlighted, and provides a clear picture of Russia’s prioritization of radical over incremental innovation, sometimes to the detriment of current battlefield readiness. This research brief discusses Russia’s successes and failures in modernizing its weapons systems since 2000.
This is a pioneering examination of the burgeoning US-China defense technological competition and provides perspectives not only from US analysts but also from China and Russia. One of the major contributions of the book is the use of a competitive strategies framework that outlines some of the key considerations in the assessment of US–China military technological competition. A rich and expansive discussion of this competition across a diverse range of domains, including air, sea, space, and emerging technologies, provides a comprehensive understanding of how complex and varied this contest is becoming, as well as its strategic and global implications.
In this CNA Occasional Paper, Russian East Asia expert Vasily Kashin examines the current state of Russian-Chinese defense and security cooperation, Russia’s approach to developing it, and the possible outcomes of a further Russia-China rapprochement. He highlights the historical antecedents to the unprecedently long period of close ties between the two countries, focusing on the mutual advantages derived by both countries from defense industrial cooperation. The paper describes the gradually depending nature of bilateral military cooperation across a number of domains, including arms sales and joint exercises. The paper also addresses Russia’s evolving views on China’s increasing global role and the potential for an even closer Russia-China strategic alliance in the future, concluding that although the two countries are not ready for Western-style cooperation in defense technology, they are gradually moving toward a security partnership characterized by greater integration and interdependence.
This article examines the first years of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) through the prism of the Eurasian Economic Union Court’s jurisprudence and draws parallels with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The EAEU Court has taken first steps in establishing an autonomous legal order, but also in linking it with international law. It has interpreted the relevant law to create a system of legal remedies and started in the interpretive construction of a common market. We conclude that some differences to EU law are due to the institutional context. At the same time, the EAEU Court has deliberately taken some decisions to establish its own balance between autonomy and openness of the legal order it is called to interpret and simultaneously create.
Since 2015 Eurasian Economic Commission has become a key agent of Russian external trade policy, Conjunction policy with Belt and Road Initiative and has been responsible for all current FTZ negotiations and in a future – on wider frames of international cooperation that involves economic agenda. However because of a short track list of Commission’s activity, this field is not very well studied both in Russia and abroad. This article analyzes current international tracks between Commission and Asian countries and attempts to study other formats of cooperation with Asian actors where Commission can be involved in the future according to its mandate. Our study reveals that bilateral track remains dominant between EAEU and Asian partners and a switch to multilateral tracks like EAEU-ASEAN or EAEU-RCEP can occur only in a mid-term future. Both the analysis of open negotiations and Commission’s organizational resources prove this hypothesis.
After the collapse of the bipolar world order, politicians and experts almost everywhere wiped the slate clean, leaving many political and socioeconomic theories behind. Decolonization as a dominant global development trend was among them. This happened partly because the global balance of power had changed drastically and partly because the prevailing political concepts and narratives had become universal for a short time, but mainly because this benefitted the political establishment in the United States and former colonial powers. They proclaimed the process of decolonization completed and referred to it as a past era. In reality, however, only two of its stages - attainment of formal political independence and sovereignty over natural resources - became history. Actual decolonization came with the third stage when China and a large group of rapidly developing economies had turned into the world’s manufacturing and assembly factories. This process was bolstered up and further spurred by the emancipation of Russia which had reemerged as one of the leading global players. Coming up is the next, and final, stage of actual decolonization. Its purpose is to acquire technological and financial independence and ability to parry military power or threat of force whatever its origin. There are many factors, objective and subjective, that get in the way. These include political destabilization and pressure, redirection of financial flows, sanctions, wars, etc.. But they will not have a critical impact if they are countered cleverly and all constructive forces around the world pool their efforts towards cooperation. With such an understanding of global processes, ongoing worldwide transformations no longer look like unpredictable and tragic chaotization of international relations but are being taken for what they actually are: the struggle for complete decolonization of the parts of the planet that used to be dependent territories.
После казалось бы беспросветного тупика в урегулировании ядерного кризиса на Корейском полуострове там появились признаки изменений подходов Пхеньяна и Вашингтона к разблокированию северокорейской ядерной проблемы. Неожиданно как для экспертов, так и для всего мирового сообщества КНДР, США и Южная Корея объявили о резком изменении политического курса от тотальной конфронтации к переговорам, поиску компромисса по ядерной проблеме КНДР.
The forecast covers the period up to 2035. It describes dynamic trends that will shape the future of the world during the nearest 20 years. The aim of this study is to foresee the challenges awaiting the world and the forthcoming opportunities which can be used in the interests of the Russian state, ensuring its role as an active participant in the formation of the future world order. The book presents a general analysis of the main trends of world development, its spiritual culture, ideology, politics, innovation, economy, social sphere and interna tional security, the problems of globalization and regionalism. The final section of the book presents strategic recommendations for Russia. Prospective readers of this book include staff members of government institutions and management bodies, research, expert and business communities. It also may be recommended for student scholars of international affairs.
The article focuses on the main factors underlying the structural transformation of China’s economic model under Xi Jinping and its implications for Sino-Russian economic cooperation and Russian merchandise exports. Russian exports to China are analyzed in the context of major changes in the volume and structure of China's aggregate demand. The results show that the rebalancing of the Chinese economy would bring some risks to Russia in the short and medium terms through putting downward pressure on its exports of natural resources (except for natural gas). At the same time it would open new opportunities for industries producing resource-intensive consumer goods and, therefore, gives Russia an opportunity for diversification of its economy in the longer term. In order to derive benefits from China’s transformation, Russia should shift the focus of its export policy from negotiating politically driven large projects towards more intensive promotion of consumer goods exports.
Facing the profound transformations generated by the forthcoming Fourth Industrial Revolution, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) may not turn out to be among its beneficiaries. The research question of this paper is why Vietnam’s system of higher education is not able to effectively respond to the challenges resulting from the disruptive technologies. While selective aspects of this problem have been captured by K. Schwab, G. Sheridan, D. Taglioni, M. Hayden, S. Ryazantsev, N. Kuznetsov, Huynh Phu, Le Thi Kim Anh, Nguyen Hong Minh and other researchers, a cutting-edge study focusing on the ability of Vietnam’s education system to timely and comprehensively respond to the upcoming transformations has been absent thus far. The academic novelty of this paper is its analytical prism linking the identification of the presumed repercussions of the Fourth Industrial Revolution upon Vietnam with the readiness of the SRV’s system of higher education to make use of them to the country’s greatest advantage. The approach to the research question represents the synergy of qualitative and quantitative methods. The study is founded on primary sources and includes materials published by the SRV’s Ministry of Planning and Investment, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the SRV, Vietnam’s higher education institutions, speeches and interviews with Vietnamese government officials, and statistical data. The principal findings of the study represent the identification of the potential of Vietnam’s higher education system to meet the challenges stemming from the Fourth Industrial Revolution, while taking into account its accumulated shortcomings and the present preparedness to be involved in the worldwide digital teaching and learning environment.