Historically, the central principles of international peacekeeping have been formulated by western powers due to their political and ideological domination in international institutions, including the United Nations (UN) family. It is only recently that emerging powers, among them Russia and China, have started to formulate their own policies of peacekeeping and to implement them in practice. While the general objectives of peacekeeping as understood by western nations and emerging powers are similar, there are differences of emphasis. Recent developments in Syria and the active involvement of Russia in these events have underscored the nuanced views these two approaches hold on peacekeeping in general and on outside involvement in peacekeeping operations.
For the United States and many European countries, the goal of peacekeeping and conflict resolution is to protect individual rights and freedoms and to accomplish a “democratic transition” by replacing authoritarian regimes with liberal-democratic alternatives. For Russia as well as many other emerging powers, the goal of conflict resolution and peacekeeping is to preserve and strengthen the local state structures so that they can support law and order on their territory and stabilize the situation in the country and the region. The western approach assumes that donor countries know better what to do with regard to local problems, while a “rising powers” approach is far less dogmatic and recognizes the right of actors to make mistakes along the way.
This article focuses on Russia’s approaches to peacekeeping as they are defined theoretically and practicall
The paper focuses on the main factors underling the structural transformation of Asian model of socio-economic development – slowdown in economic growth, expansion of domestic consumption, increasing role of services, technological development and changes in geography of production and trade. Analysis of the factors serves as a base for the assessment of changes in the key components of aggregate demand of Asian countries as well as for the forecast of further evolution of demand and trade and economic cooperation of Asian countries with foreign partners, including Russia.
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change reflects the consensus of the world community on transition to low-carbon development. Greenhouse gas emissions reduction is closely intertwined with various national objectives, such as strengthening energy security, technological development, and many others. Transition to low-carbon development is a new reality of world energy, which brings significant risks for those who stay away from these trends.
In the world there is a rapid growth of interest in environmental issues. It brings to Russia both opportunities and risks. First connected with the country's exceptional wealth of natural capital, the value of which in time it only increases. The second - with a high level of contamination on a significant part of the country and passive environmental policies. Russia's participation in international environmental cooperation has always reflected the low priority of environmental issues on the domestic agenda and was subordinated primarily to the solution of foreign policy tasks. However, at present, among the political and business elites of Russia, the awareness of the importance of environmental issues is increasing, and as a result, in the near future Russia may become more involved in international environmental initiatives.
According to the current international climate change regime, countries are responsible for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that result from economic activities within their national borders, including emissions from producing goods for export. At the same time, imports of carbon-intensive goods are not addressed by international agreements, including the Paris Agreement that was adopted in 2015. This paper examines emissions embodied in Russia’s exports and imports based on the results of an input-output analysis. Russia is the second largest exporter of emissions embodied in trade and the large portion of these emissions is directed to developed countries. Because of the large amount of net exports of carbon-intensive goods, the current approach to emissions accounting does not suit Russia’s interests. On the one hand, Russia, as well as other large net emissions exporters, is interested in the revision of allocation of responsibility between exporters and importers of carbon-intensive products. On the other hand, both the commodity exports structure and relatively carbon inefficient technologies make Russia vulnerable to the policy of “carbon protectionism,” which can be implemented by its trade partners.
In the present political and economic trends, a timely exercise is the elaboration on a new research direction, namely studies of regionalism, both in theoretical and practical dimensions, within an active phase of globalization. Center for Asia-Pacific Studies (SAPS), Institute of World Economy and International Relations, does this with the focus upon the Asia-Pacific region developing its own approach.
The result has been three monographs in which critical Asia-Pacific issues seen through the prism of this approach were scrutinized.1) At present, the fourth monograph is being prepared.2) Besides, this approach has been tested during numerous conferences and round-table discussions both in Russia and in beyond.
The U.S. defence community is currently debating a range of capability requirements and top priority investments that will shape U.S. strategy and the use of force in the 21st century. Embedded in a broader conceptual umbrella of the Third Offset Strategy, the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) seeks to develop technologically enabled novel operational and organisational constructs. This would sustain U.S. military superiority over its capable adversaries at the operational level of war, thereby strengthening conventional deterrence. At the same time, the Third Offset strategy aims to revamp institutional agility in U.S. defence management to succeed in a dynamically evolving operational environment. By speeding up the implementation of organisational and conceptual innovation, a strategic technological advantage is sustainable. Strategic effectiveness of the Third Offset, however, will not only depend on the institutional agility and adoption capacity – the financial intensity and organisational capital required to adopt military innovations, but will also depend on the responses, resources, and counter-innovations by peer competitors. Notwithstanding the diffusion and convergence of novel technologies – electronic miniaturisation, additive manufacturing, nano-technology, artificial intelligence, space-like capabilities, and unmanned systems that are likely to alter the character of conflict over time, the patterns of “challenge, strategic response, and adaptation” will continue to shape the direction and character of long-term strategic competitions.
Accordingly, this report aims to ascertain the evolving contours of the Russian strategic thought and responses toward the Third Offset strategy. It argues that while the U.S. Third Offset is a recent development, its core technological initiatives have been a significant causeof concern for Russia for a long time. In this context, Russian responses to counter these initiatives consist of two major elements: The first one is ‘countering the Third Offset Strategy with the First Offset Strategy’, which means prioritising the development of a wide array of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons systems. For Russia, maintaining a sophisticated arsenal of nuclear weapons can effectively offset conventional military innovations of the U.S., NATO, and China. The second element of the response strategy is more ambitious, and carries greater technological risks. Russia began to counter many U.S. technological initiatives via similar indigenous programs, although more narrowly focused and smaller in scale. In October 2012, Russia established the Advanced Research Foundation (ARF) – a counterpart to the U.S. DARPA. The ARF focuses on similar areas such as the Third Offset Strategy, including hypersonic vehicles, artificial intelligence, additive technologies, unmanned underwater vehicles, cognitive technologies, directed energy weapons, and others. Although in some programmes, Russian military research and development are at initial stages relative to the U.S., in other areas such as directed energy weapons, rail gun, hypersonic vehicle; unmanned underwater vehicle programmes are progressing into advanced stages. The key challenge for Russia, however, is a sustained resource allocation to translate these disruptive innovations into actual military capabilities.
Established in 2012, the comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and Vietnam has yet to live up to its name in terms of both vision and action. Nevertheless, Russian–Vietnamese cooperation is embedded in Russia's emerging Eurasian priorities. Indeed, Russia’s prospective plans for its relations with ASEAN within the context of the Greater Eurasia Partnership strategy could serve to unlock the potential of the partnership between Russia and Vietnam, making it truly comprehensive and strategic.